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is also interesting to note that Denmark has recently enacted somewhat
similar legislation. 0 It has established a system of independent courts
to deal with labor disputes, but, curiously enough, left the selection of
judges to private organizations. This is certainly a departure from
the usual course of procedure, involving as it does the court of highest
instance within a particular field.
It is evident that the courts have been unable to bring about indus-
trial peace in this country. There is some possibility that labor and
capital will settle their differences without requiring outside interven-
tion. The prevalent view, however, appears to be that the remedy
must come through the legislatures. Probably the natural course for
them to take will be in the direction of compulsory arbitration. The
Kansas experiment may be the entering wedge, or it may show the
impracticability of such a course. 8' There undoubtedly is a solution
to this problem, and it is to be hoped that the legislatures will make
a serious effort to discover it. Certainly it would be a sinister con-
fession of weakness if a democracy were to admit that it could devise
no means to control and put an end to private warfare between two
such large groups of its citizens.
JUDGMENT OR SATISFACTION AS PASSING TITLE
"The controversy whether the title to a converted chattel vests in a
defendant by simple judgment, or only after the satisfaction of the
judgment, is, therefore, but another battle of the knights over the gold
and silver shield. Under some circumstances the title changes by the
judgment alone; in other cases satisfaction is necessary to produce
that result."'-
Such was the conclusion of Ames on the mooted question whether,
in an action for conversion, the mere entry of a judgment for the
value of the converted chattel, or the payment of the judgment, passed
the title of the chattel to the converter. The early cases stated that
title passed by the judgment.2  It has long been the fashion, however,
to say that, not the judgment, but only satisfaction of it passes the'
" The Danish Labor Court, (Dec. 9, i92o) Industrial Information Service 3-6.
"t This and other measures will be taken up in a further comment."Ames, The Nature of Ownership (1890) 3 HARv. L. REv. 23, 313, 327, 3 Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (ig..) 561, 578, Lectures in Legal
History (1913) 209.
'Adams v. Broughton (0708, K. B.) 2 Strange, 1077; Smith v. Gibson (1737,
K. B.) i Cas. T. Hardw. 319; Brown v. Wotton, (i6o6, K. B.) Cro. Jac. 73,
Yelv. 67, Moore, 762; Bishop v. Montague,"(i6oi, C. P.) Cro. Eliz. 824. See also
Buckland v. Johnson (1854, C. P.) 15 C. B. 145; Cboper v. Shepherd (1846, C. P.)
3 C. B. 265; note to Bennett v. Brandao (i843,,C. P.) 6 Man. & Grang. 630, 640;
Kitch n v. Campbell (1772, C. P.) 3 Wils. 304, 309, 2 Win. Black 779, 827; see
also discussion of the earlier cases in Brinsmead v. Harrison (1871) L. R. 6 C. P.
584, (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 547. For cases in the Year Bool s see note 5, infra,
and cf. Keil. 58b.
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title.3 Thus the court in Decker v. Milwaukee Cold Storage Co.
(i92o, Wis.) i8o N. W. 256, states that, by the "great weight of
authority", it is only the satisfaction of the judgment which, by law,
divests the original owner of his title. Much of the difficulty and much,
though not all, of the conflict in the cases comes from the use of the
uncertain and indefinite term "title" to express varying legal situations
for which a closer definition is desirable. "Title" is a concept of 'much
agility. Generally, when it appears, we find in it a tendency to flit here
and there with a suddenness which is surprising, and hence we should
not be surprised to find it possessing these characteristics in the situation
under discussion.4  The confusion comes from the fact that title is
applied to an aggregate-a "bundle"-of legal relations, and we find
the term used indiscriminately to indicate a bundle of various sizes.
Thus, if the term means the passing of all legal interest in the chattel
from the original owner, title does not pass until satisfaction of the
judgment; if, however, it means the passing of some interest from the
owner, it passes at least on judgment, if not before.
5 Although Ames
adhered to the traditional term "title", he had this distinction clearly
in mind in the passage quoted above, where he suggests that some
'Brinsinead v.. Harrison, supra note 2; Atwater v. Tupper (1877) 45 Conn.
144; Miller v. Hyde (1894) 161 Mass. 472, 37 N. E. 76o; Tolman Co. v. Waite
(1899) 199 Mich. 341, 78 N. W. 124; Russell v. McCall (1894) 341 N. Y. 437,
36 N. E. 498; see also 2 Kent, Commentaries, *388. See cases collected in 15
Ann. Cas. 454, note, 26 R. C. L. 1157, 38, Cyc. 2112. In 38 Cyc. 2112, many cases
are cited as holding in accord with the old rule. Most of them may be dis-
tinguished as pointed out in this comment. In accord with the former rule,
however, see Hydi v. Kiehl (i898) 183 Pa. 4-4, 38 Atl. 998; Merrick's Estate
(1842, Pa.) 5 W. & S. 9, 17; Wilburn v. Bogan (1842, S. C.) i Spear, 179;
Murrell v. Johnson's Administrator (38o7, Va.) I H. & M. 449; and cf. Par-
reenter v. Barstow (1899) 21 R. I. 430, 43 Ati 3O35.
" See Corbin, What is a Transfer of Title (i92o) 29 YAIE LAw JOURNAL, 429;
also, as to the somewhat similar term "own," cf. Cook, Hohfeld's Contribution
to the Law (3939) 28 id. 72r, 725.
'The language of the cases in the Year Books on election of remedies-
"disseisin by election"-indicates that the election to divest the property out of
oneself was made by the bringing of the action. (344o), Y. B. 19 Hen. VI, p. 65,
pl. 5; (1462) Y. B. 2 Edw. IV, p. 16, pl. 8; (i4o5) Y. B. 6 Hen. VII, p. 8, pl. 4.
Compare as to realty, Co. Lit. 323 b, and see Holmes, J., dissenting, in Miller v.
Hyde, supra note 3; see also Bordwell, Property in the Trespasser (19x6) 29
H.xv. L. REV. 374, 385. This was the view of Anderson and Warburton, JJ., in
Bishop v. Montague, supra note 2; cf. cases in note 2, supra. Yet since a non-
suit was and is so freely permitted and is no bar in another suit the question
should not be of importance. See Co. Lit. 139 a; Outhwaite v. Hudson (1852)
7 Exch. 380; Bacon Abr. tit, Non-Suit: 18 C. J. 153, 1171. As Holmes says,
in Miller v. Hyde, supra note 3, "An election is determined by judgment." There
are, however, cases holding that the election is finally and conclusively made by
the bringing of the suit. Ireland v. Waymire (192o, Kan.) 191 Pac. 304, criticised
in (192o) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2o6, citing Keener, Quai-Contracts (x893)
203-213; Corbin, Waiver of Tort (1gio) 19 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 221, 239; (1919)
28 id. 4o9. In Brown v. Wootton, supra note 2, the court treated the judgment
rather as res judicata than as an election.
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interest passes on judgment and the rest on satisfaction. In fact, he
gives a new twist to the term, showing it to be a variable thing,
while the usual fallacy is to use it in the belief that it means a fixed and
certain thihg. The real issue therefore is, to ascertain just how much
of a legal interest passed from owner to converter at each stage of the
proceedings.
Even by the conversion the converter has bettered his legal position
somewhat with respect to the chattel, for, by the more generar rule, he
gets "title as against all The world except the true owner" and those
claiming under the true owner, i.e., he may sue or defend on the strength
of his possession.6 But since disseisin of chattels does not carry.as inl-
portant results from the standpoint of remedial relief as did the old dis-
seisin of realty, 7 the converter has acquired as against the true owner
little more than a liability to a judgment of some kind. Suppose such
judgment to be entered. If it is for the redelivery of the chattel, obvi-
ously "title" has not passed, that is, the converter has acquired no further
legal interest in the chattel. If it is for the value of the chattel, has a
further legal interest been acquired? In one respect at least, there has,
since a former judgment may be pleaded under the doctrine that no one
is to be sued twice for the same wrong. After a judgment for the
value of the chattel, the original owner can no longer sue the converter
for the chattel itself or for its value. Trespass, trover, implied
assumpsit, detinue, and, it seems, replevin, or their descendants
under the codes, all are barred by the judgment in trover5 The con-
verter is immune from suit and thus has approached-complete 'owner-
ship. What does he lack?
Before attempting an answer to this question, it may be well to state
'By the weight of authority title in a third party is not a defense to an action
for conversion, unless the defendant connects himself with such title. See cases
collected, 38 Cyc. 2o62; 26 R. C. L. 1141.
'See Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin (1921) 34 H.4Av. L. REv. 592, 604, 6o9;
and see also articles by Bordwell, supra note 5, and Ames, supra note i.
'Nemo bis vexari debet pI-o eadem causa. Kitchen v. Campbell, supra note z;
Smith v: Gibson, supra note z; Ferrer's Case (I598, C. P.) Coke, Pt. 6, 7a;Singer & Co. v. Yaduski (19o2) ii Pa. Dist. Rep. 57,; Rembert v. Hally (185o,
Tenn.) io Humph. 513; Lacon v. Barnard (1627, C. P.) Cro. Car. 35; Wooley v.
Carter (1823, N. J. L.) 2 Halst. 45; Lovejoy v. Wallace (1865, U. S.) 3 Wall.
i, i; Rauer v. Rynd (i9r5) 27 Calif. App. 556, 15o Pac. 78o; Mead v. Mead
(1911) 115 Minn. 524, 132 N. W. 1132; Smith v. Clark (1909) 37 Utah, 116, io6
Pac. 653, 26 L. R. A. (x. s.) 281, note; Oliver v. Grand Ronde Grain Co. (1914)
72 Ore. 46, 142 Pac. 541. See cases collected 23 Cyc. 1321. The judgment must
of course be for the value of the chattel anid not merely damages for the taking,
i. e., the issue must be the same. Lacon v. Barnard, supra. It might be thought
that the unpaid plaintiff should still have replevin. While the authority is scanty,
this does not seem to be true. Cf. Rauer v. Rynd, supra; Mead v. Mead, supra.And if it were, we should have this dilemma, that the plaintiff would be-entitled
to possession notwithstanding the judgment in trover, and if defendant refused
to give up possession on demand he would be guilty of conversion and then
trover would again lie I
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another point as to which the courts are coming more and more into
general agreement: It is a general principle of the law of torts that a
judgment against ond of two joint tort-feasors is no bar to a suit
against the other until the judgment is -satisfied2" Unlike the rule
against double vexation, there is no socially desirable principle that a
man should be relieved of his tort by the mere entry of a judgment,
which has not been paid, against another. So, in accord with this
principle, we find many cases allowing successive suits against joint
converters or against successive converters brought before the first
judgment for the value of the chattel.1 In fact almost all of the cases
involve this point, and, while the rule of law will be stated broadly that
satisfaction is necessary to the passing of title, actually it will be only a
case of a joint wrong or of a conversion from the converter."' Such
was the actual decision in Decker v. Milwaukee Cold Storage Co.,
supra, .where a factor had wrongfully transferred the plaintiff's goods
to the cold storage company. It was held that an unsatisfied judgment
for conversion against the factor did not bar replevin by the owners
against the storage company. Each case it cites to show the "great
weight of authority" presents only an analogous situation and not a
case where one is claiming by transfer from the judgment debtor after
the judgment.
Hence we see that joint or successive converters may be sued until
satisfaction is obtained, while the mere entry of judgment gives an
immunity from suit to the defendant converter who is sued. What is
the position of those who take from the converter after judgment?
Ames suggested acutely,12 and his suggestion has been adopted by
learned commentators,'1 3 that the answer to this question should depend
upon who has possession at the time of the judgment. If the converter
has possession at the time of the judgment, "the converter's possession,
"being thus set free from adverse claims, changes into ownership," and
subsequent possessors are protected; whereas, if there is a change of
possession before judgment'against the converter, the new possessor
'That judgment against one of two joint tort-feasors without satisfaction is no
bar to a suit against the other-the usual rule in America-see Livingston v. Bishop
(i8o6, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) I Johns. 29o; Litchfield v. Goodnow (1887) 123 U. S. 549,
8 Sup. Ct. 21o; Lumber Co. v. Bah'ks (19o7) 118 Tenn. 627, 102 S. W. 79; but
see contra, Petticolas v. Richmond (1897) 95 Va. 456, 28 S. E. 566; and Brins-
mead v. Harrison, supra note 2, (criticised by Ames, op. cit. note i). For cases
collected see 23 Cyc. 1212.
"Such were the cases in note 3 .upra. Thus in Miller v. Hyde there were
successive conversions, and in Atwater v. Tupper there was a joint conversion.
See also Matthews v. Menedger (1840, C. C. 7th) 2 McLean, 145; Sharp 'v. Gray
(1844, Ky.) 5 B. Mon. 4; Hopkins v. Hersey (1841) 20 Me. 449; McGee v.
Overley (I85I), 12 Ark. 164; Dow v. King (1889) 52 Ark..282, 12 S. W. 577;
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Skillman (189o) 52 N. J. L. 263, ig Atl. 260.
"1 Cf. cases in notes 3 and io supra.
"Ames, op. cit., note i.
" See NoTEs (1902) I6 HARV. L. REv. 131.
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is not so protected. On the surface' at least there seems to be no logical
sequence from cause to result. Is it, as Ames suggests, analogous to
the running of the statute of limitations where "possession ripens into
"ownership?" There is a certain analogy, it is true, but it is believed
that the reason for the' rule suggested by Ames goes deeper. It is
simply an application of the rule against double vexation to allow the
taker from the judgment debtor to be in as good a position as the
debtor is and. to have a like immunity from suit. Hence under this
view neither the converter nor those claimiuig under him after the
judgment, i. e., in privity with him, may be sued.Y But suit may be
brought against all others not occupying this favored position.1 5 Or,
as is so often expressed, judgments bind parties thereto and their
privies, and as those claiming under the converter after the judgment
are in privity with him, the judgment is binding upon them and in their
favor.'
Our sympathies for the unpaid plaintiff may lead us to object to this
view, but it is thought that from the standpoint of reason and justice
there is much to be said for it. If the converter finds that his judgment
does not enable him to sell the chattel with any degree of safety, his
immunity from another suit is of indifferent value. This may not
cause us discomfort, since with an unsatisfied judgment against him
he is not in a position to make any particular appeal to our sympathies.
And the rule* against double vexation is probably only partly for his
protection, for the courts themselves need some protection and this is a
device to prevent litigation from lasting forever.'7 'But the position
of the taker from the converter is more appealing. Acting subsequent
to a judgment for the value of the chattel, and quite probably upon
' For good discussion see Barb v. Fish (1847, Ind.) 8 Blackf. 481, 485; 'see also
0844) 3 AmER. L. MAG. 49, infra note 18. A creditor of the converter may
take the chattel on execution against the converter. Rogers v. Moore (1838,
S. C.) Rice, 6o; Norrill v. Corley (1828, S. C.) 2 Rich. Eq. .288; Fornman v.
Nielson (1846, S. C.) 2 Rich. Eq. 387; Norris v. Beckley (1818, S. C.) 2 Const.
Rep. ,228; but cf. Bush v. Bush (1847, S. C.) i Strob. Eq. 377. In Eckert v.
Truman (I914). 163 App. Div. 17, 148 N. Y. Supp. 48, it was said that while
satisfaction of a judgment for conversion was necessary for the passage of title,"still the act of suing for conversion did change plaintiff's position," and he was
no longer entitled to possession of the chattel. Hence the converter and her
sor to whom she claimed to have sold the chattel were not guilty of contimpt
of court in refusing to deliver it over to the plaintiff. For a somewhat similar
situation, 6ee Deitz v. Field (1896) io App. Div. 425, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1087; but
see Union Pac. Ry. v. Schiff .(1897, S. D. N. Y.) 78 Fed. 216, (1898, C. C. A. 2d)
86 Fed. 1023.
"'As above noted, the usual case is that of the joint wrong-doer. See notes 3,
1O, and ii supra. As to those who take from or dispossess, the converter prior
to judgment, see Morris v. Robinson (1824, K. B.) 3 Barn. & Cres. 196.
"8Lovejoy v. Murray (1865, U. S.) 3 Wall. I, 18; Litchfield v. Goodnow, supra
note 9; 23 Cyc. 1227, 1253, 1259.
" See remarks in Ferrer's Case, Kitchen v. Campbell, and the other cases cited
in note 8 supra, especially Lovejoy v. Murray, supra note 16, at 1p. 19.
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faith of it, he surely is more deerving of protection than the man who
has had his election of. remedies and has taken his choice, who has
chosen to pursue that course which he thought would bring him the
most advantage, and who, moreover, has had the opportunity of enforc-
ing his judgment by levying execution on the chattel itself while it was
in the converter's hands. There is some support for this view in the
cases, but there are few direct precedents on the point and they are not
harmonious. Some of the cases cited by Ames fail to support his
position. The issue is obscured by the general statement that "title"
passes at one time or another."8 But the cases which do not afford
protection by the judgment to those claiming under the judgment
debtor surely reach an anomalous result, for the converter-perhaps an
intentional and malicious wrong-doer-is no longer subject to a suit,
while his innocent victims are. Some way should be sought in the
event of such a holding, to avoid the ruling that the initial converter
cannot again be sued. Perhaps it might be said that the action result-
ing in the judgment put in issue the title but not the immediate right
to possession, which could be sued upon in a subsequent action of
replevin. Yet this seems unsound, for the action does put in issue
also the question of possession.1 9  Ames' view that one claiming under
the judgment debtor by a transfer after judgment is protected would
appear to be the sounder. Moreover, it avoids another anomaly, that
of shielding the hardened converter who knows the law, for he will
either not attempt to sell the chattel concerned in the judgment or will
pick his victim with care before he vanishes. Any unexpected rule of
law-any rule opposed to ordinary business practice-puts him who
has had experience with it and knowledge of it at an advantage over
"Only in Barb v. Fish, supra note x4, does there seem to be an appreciation
of the point that title included many legal relations, not all of which change
at any one time. Ames' position is in general supported by the cases cited 
in
note 14, though some of them speak of the judgment as passing title, i. e., the
old common-law rule. As contra, should probably be stated cases where 
it is
said that satisfaction is necessary, and no point is made whether the defendant
claims under and subsequent to the former judgment or not. Ledbetter v.
Embree (895) 12 Ind. App. 617, 40 N. E. 920; Spivey v. Morris (i856) i8 Ala.
254; Osterhout v. Roberts (1827, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8 Cow. 43; Goff 
v. Craven
(x884, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 34 Hun,.i5o (see criticism by Ames, op. cit. note i). In
Spivey v. Morris and Osterhout v. Roberts, however, the defendant did not show
himself in privity with the judgment debtor after the judgment and hence 
the
cases are merely siinilar to those in notes 3 and IO supra. In an interesting
article, Transfer of Personal Property by Judgment (i844) 3 AMTER. L. MAG. 49
the conclusion is reached "that a judgment in trespass or trover without 
satis-
faction will not transfer the title to the defendant, though such judgment 
is
pleadable in bar to any action by the same plaintiff and his privies, against 
the
same defendant and his privies."
" See note 8, supra. The crux of the matter is here, for surely we should not
wish to treat the converter more gently than his transferee. Those who 
would
favor the unpaid plaintiff should attack, therefore, the whole rule of the 
binding
force of former judgments.
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the ordinary innocent law-abiding citizen, and this is thought to be
such a rule.
2 0
Should the converter secure from the judgment also an immunity
from self-help, i. e., from a retaking of the chattel by the owner? An
English case held that the owner might himself retake his chattel from
the converter in spite of a judgment for its value in his favor .2 1  This
does not conflict with our rules of policy suggested above, but it may
be questioned how far, in view of the desirability of avoiding free
fights, self-help should be available when court aid is not. It has
been held in New Hampshire that a retaking by the owner after judg-
ment but before satisfaction makes the owner liable in trover to the
converter after the latter has paid the judgment. 2 2  This result seems
preferable, though it is placed on the fiction-unnecessary under Ames'
reasonig-of "title relating back" to the conversion or the judgment
when satisfaction is at length made.23
Decker v. Milwaukee Cold Storage Co., therefore, states only the
ordinary rule applicable to joint or successive converters. To explain
the decision in terms of the passage of title does not solve more difficult
questions with which the court may be confronted in the future. Itmay then be desirable to point out that, while joint or successive wrong-
doers are not protected by a bare judgment against one of their number,
yet such a judgment will be protection both to those.who are parties to
it and to those who claim under parties to it.
C. E.C.
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENT WHO REFUSES TO OBTAIN MEDICAL
TREATMENT FOR SICK CHILD
The increasing number of persons whose religious belief discounte-
nances the use of medicine in the treatment of disease gives considerable
importance to the interesting legal questions which arise when a parent,
because of religious conviction, fails to provide medical attention forhis sick child. Two fairly recent cases have expressed opposite views
20 It might be claimed that only those who purchase from the judgment debtorshould be entitled to the protection of his judgment. It is thought, however, thatthe reasons suggested in the text are strong enough to justify protection for anykind of a taker from the converter after a judgment against the latter. Onlythen can the converter's immunity from further suit-except on the judgment
debt-be made practically complete and effective.
'Ex parte Drake (1877) L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 866.
"Smith v. Smith (1872) 51 N. H. 571; cf. Greer v. Lafayette County Bank(1898, Tex. Civ. App.) 47 S. W. 737; Acheson v. Miller (1853) 2 Oh. St. 2o3.
' The same rule applies to increase of the chattel prior to satisfaction. Hep-burn v. Sewell (1821, Md.) 5 H. & J. 211; White v. Martin (1834, Ala.) I Port.215. The doctrine of relation is criticised by Holmes in Miller v. Hyde, supranote 3, and by Ames, op. cit. note I. In Bacon v. Kummel (1866) 14 Mich. 2o,it was held not to apply so as to make an otherwise rightful act a trespass.Cf. Third Nat'l Bank v. Rice (19o8, C. C. A. 8th) 161 Fed. 822, 15 Ann. Cas.
450, note.
